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This paper examines the relationship between inequality and happiness through the 
lens of heterogeneous values, beliefs and inclinations. Drawing upon opinion data 
from the European Social Survey for twenty-three countries, we find that 
individual views on a wide range of themes can be effectively summarized by two 
orthogonal dimensions: moderation and inclusiveness. The former is defined as a 
tendency to take mild stands on issues rather than extreme ones; the latter is 
defined as the degree of support for a social model that grants equal rights and 
opportunities to everyone who willingly subscribes to a shared set of rules, 
regardless of background and circumstances. These traits matter when it comes to 
how inequality affects subjective well-being; specifically, those who are either more 
moderate or more inclusive than their average compatriot tend to dislike inequality. 
With reference to moderation, inequality aversion can be read in terms of a desire 
for stability: people who are reluctant to take strong stands probably dislike 
conflict, tension and unrest, which normally accompany inequalities. With 
reference to inclusiveness, the main element at play is likely to be distress accruing 
to a perception of unfairness. 
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Does inequality have an eect on well-being? Is this eect uniform across
countries and people? These are very important research questions, if only
on account of the political relevance of debates on redistribution. Through
the decades, dierent disciplines have oered a number of answers.
Economists have proposed to qualify inequality according to the eect
it exerts on material proxies for aggregate welfare. A large literature, re-
viewed in Aghion, Caroli and Garc a-Pe~ nalosa [1999] and Bertola [1999],
studies the correlations between income inequality and the growth rate of
GDP per capita. Inequality seems to emerge as bad for growth whenever
it causes conict and unrest, undermining institutions and markets [Alesina
and Perotti, 1996; Keefer and Knack, 2002], and whenever it results in dis-
tortionary redistribution [Persson and Tabellini, 1996] or suboptimal invest-
ment in schooling on the part of the disadvantaged [Galor and Zeira, 1993].
However, the signicance of these conclusions wavers; results have been
found to depend on the temporal or spatial reference frame [Forbes, 2000].
Moral philosophers and social choice scholars generally base their evalu-
ations on a theory of justice: inequality is acceptable only insofar as it can
be considered fair. Most proposals dene fairness with reference to the con-
cepts of original position and veil of ignorance, as dened by Rawls [1971]: a
fair allocation of resources is such that it would be chosen by a planner who
has no information about what his own social position will be in the post-
allocation world. When it comes to actual income distributions, the preva-
lent consensus is that disparity accruing to dierent levels of eort is accept-
able, disparity accruing to mere circumstances is not [Dworkin, 1981a and
1981b; Cohen, 1989; Arneson, 1989]; researchers divide over where the line
between the two should be drawn [Roemer, 2000; Fleurbaey, 2001; Lefranc,
Pistolesi and Trannoy, 2006], and sometimes deeper objections emerge over
the ultimate purpose of egalitarian thought [Anderson, 1999].
The two camps might be partly coming together. Economists have been
showing interest in the links between equality of opportunity and observed
income mobility [Jencks and Tach, 2006]; strategies for the measurement
of chances are being investigated [Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menendez,
2003]. Still, the end of disciplinary isolation has not been without pain.
A paradigmatic controversy followed the release of the World Development
2Report 2006 [World Bank, 2005], a document prepared annually by World
Bank economists in order to assess the state of global poverty. The World
Bank recommended the promotion of equal opportunity policies in develop-
ing countries on the grounds that they stimulate growth, only to be called
to task by Roemer [2006] on the subject of why we would need evidence
on GDP in order to sponsor a policy that already has the ethical edge over
alternatives.
The problem seems to lie in the nature of the subject. The very choice of
either justice or growth as a yardstick for the ranking of alternative distribu-
tions inevitably calls into question the intellectual and ethical acceptability
of values and representations lying behind the adoption of such a metric;
discussions polarize over what could be best described as articles of faith.
The availability of data on subjective well-being or "happiness", progres-
sively gaining credibility in economics after long employment in psychology
[Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Di Tella and McCulloch, 2006], might oer a way
to dodge the dilemma: rather than ask whether inequality is good or bad
per se, we could ask whether people like it or not. The qualication of in-
equality based on whether it makes people feel happy is, technically, just as
arbitrary as the ones based on whether it spurs economic growth or com-
plies with certain assumptions on justice. Still, it appears to be less likely
to rue feathers.
More importantly, the happiness perspective might be particularly suited
to the problem in a methodological sense, on account of its intrinsic focus on
heterogeneity. While it is very hard to nd someone who is made happy by
blatant misfortunes such as illness or widowhood, the connection between
subjective well-being and most of its determinants has been found to be in
the eye of the beholder. Not only do dierent people have dierent baseline
levels of happiness, mainly dictated by structural psychological inclinations
[Kahneman and Kruger, 2006], but each person seems to map events of life
into happiness levels in a dierent way, depending on individual beliefs1; see
1For example, Frey and Stutzer [2005] show that a worker's ethnic background is im-
portant in determining how workplace policies in favor of racial integration aect her
happiness. Becchetti, Castriota and Giuntella [2006] use data on subjective well-being
to estimate how the trade-o between ination and unemployment diers across social
groups, following the idea of community group indierence maps originally provided by
Chossudovsky [1972]. McFarlin and Rice [1992] prove that subjective facet importance is
a non-negligible factor in determining overall levels of job satisfaction. Kohler, Behrman
and Skytthe [2005] nd that the impact of parenthood on happiness can be dierent for
3Rojas [2005 and 2007] for an outline of the conceptual-referent theory of
happiness, centered around the idea that
the subjective evaluation of life as a whole is inuenced by a
person's notion of what a happy life is.
Inequality, as suggested by the heated debate in the literature, belongs
to the set of political and emotional wedge issues that positively demands
a particular eort in understanding how features of the self lter facts into
welfare.
This paper explores the connection between income distribution and
happiness, attempting to bring together suggestions from dierent strains
of literature in a simple model. We posit that people can like or dislike
inequality for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to how they
feel about their own position in the social pecking order, whether they read
inequality as a proxy of opportunity or not, what moral judgement they
have about unequal distribution of privileges independent of their personal
circumstances, and what level of importance they attach to the issue. We
nd that, while most of these factors matter individually, only the interaction
between them might be the key to drawing a precise map of attitudes.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
literature on inequality and happiness. Section 3 introduces our model.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix provides further tables.
2 The literature
Many papers have been written on the relationship between inequality and
happiness. A large majority incorporate the idea that the connection is
strongly subjective in nature; the individual lter has been analyzed from
dierent angles. The positional approach is perhaps most popular: people
do not like to see inequality because it makes them feel bad about their own
circumstances relative to others. The relatively poor resent their economic
inferiority (envy), and the relatively rich resent their enjoyment of privileges
that others do not have access to (guilt). In their seminal paper on cooper-
mothers and fathers.
4ative behavior in games, Fehr and Schmidt [1999] term the combination of
these feelings "self-centered inequity aversion".
The theme of envy has illustrious precedents: the idea that upward com-
parison leads to dissatisfaction dates as far back as Veblen [1899], and was
greatly expanded upon by Easterlin [1974] and Hirsch [1976] in their studies
on adaptive expectations and status signaling. If we assume that individual
desire for consumption is inuenced by social standards, then we can add
a further nuance to the argument: the comparison with others becomes, to
a certain extent, also a comparison with one's own aspirations, and people
who lag behind the rest of society are unhappy not only because they feel
they are below others, but also because they feel powerless to achieve their
own goals. Psychology oers a wide class of "have-want" models for the
analysis of such inclinations, recently adopted by economists interested in
happiness [Stutzer, 2004; Easterlin, 2006]. Clark and Oswald [2006] nd
that the self-reported satisfaction of British workers is negatively related
with their benchmark wage, i.e. the average wage earned by workers with
the same qualications and experience; Luttmer [2005] has similar results
for the United States. There are even indications that this type of feeling
might not be exclusive to humans, as shown by the experiments on monkeys
conducted by Brosnan and de Waal [2003]: capuchin monkeys trained to
exchange rock tokens for food react badly whenever they perceive that they
are being shortchanged compared to their peers.
The idea of guilt as an engine of inequality aversion on the part of the
rich, on the other hand, is not as unanimously accepted. Several results
in behavioral economics appear to prove that downward comparison might
curb happiness because of a number of factors, including but not limited to
feelings of altruism, a yearning for justice, fear that a privileged place in soci-
ety can make one the target of resentment and violence, and even an interest
in allocative eciency. An example of other-regarding concerns is provided
by a popular two-player experiment known as the Ultimatum Game, where
Player 1 has a sum of money to split with Player 2, and has to propose a
partition. If Player 2 accepts the partition, the two players go through with
it; if she rejects it, neither gets anything. In several cultures, Player 1 rou-
tinely proposes an equal split, and the cases where mainstream predictions
from economic theory obtain - Player 1 endows Player 2 with the smallest
amount possible and Player 2 accepts the oer - are virtually nonexistent
5[Homan, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Henrich et
al, 2004]2. However, oft-proven theories of competitive consumption state
that utility might be a positive function of the ability to buy goods that
not everybody can aord. Also, the role played by perceptions of individual
merit seems to be important: Homan, McCabe, Shachat and Smith [1994]
nd that the Ultimatum Game produces outcomes that are less egalitarian
when the player who has to propose the partition is chosen by way of a skill-
based game rather than randomly. Contrary to the basic version, winners in
the rst game do not shy away from proposing unequal splits; probably, this
happens because they feel that they have earned a prize, and losers seem to
accept the logic. A simple generalization of this result to real-life scenarios
implies that the rich would feel unhappy over inequality only if they believed
that their wealth was undeserved.
This type of consideration calls into play another key aspect of subjec-
tivity, to which a growing body of literature is devoted: interpretation. The
link between inequality and happiness is individualized not only because ev-
eryone looks at the distribution of income from their own rung in the social
ladder, but also because dierent people may read dierent features of the
world in the same Gini coecient, and each of them may judge these features
dierently, based on cultural background and personal values. In their paper
on individual beliefs and redistributive policies, B enabou and Tirole [2005]
show that Americans mostly tend to see poverty as an indicator of laziness,
and inequality as a signal of mobility. Conversely, Europeans generally be-
lieve that the poor are mainly unlucky, and inequality evokes the idea of
unearned privilege. Alesina, Di Tella and McCulloch [2004] specically look
at whether the relationship between inequality and happiness varies across
the two continents, and come to the same conclusion: the American poor
do not dislike inequality (because they believe that adequate eort will save
them), the European poor do dislike inequality (because they feel stuck).
A wariness of inequality is also found for the share of rich Americans who
describe themselves as left-leaning, bringing us back to the close relation-
ship between wealth, perceived fairness, and guilt; aversion to the element
of potential loss implicit in mobility is oered as another explanation. Gra-
2There is an ongoing debate about whether this behavior is driven mainly by emotions,
by formal ethical considerations on the subject of fairness, or by a mixture of the two
[Charness and Rabin, 2002; L opez-P erez, 2005].
6ham and Felton [2006] nd that in Latin America the correlation between
inequality and happiness is strongly negative, since most people perceive
it as an indicator of persistent social rifts and poverty traps. Clark [2003]
estimates the eects on happiness of relative income and absolute level of
inequality in Britain; he nds that happiness is increasing in both, indicat-
ing that people probably approve of competing but disapprove of losing. On
the other hand, Hagerty [2000] estimates a negative link between inequality
and happiness on a cross-section of countries.
3 The model
The model we propose integrates the suggestions of the literature discussed
above with a systematic attempt at formalizing the precise nature of the
process through which agents lter perceptions of inequality into feelings of
happiness.
The idea is as follows. Individuals look at the whole distribution of
incomes in order to determine their well-being; in particular, they take into
consideration, besides their own income, one or more measures of position,
and one or more measures of dispersion. The former constitute a reference
point for the determination of one's social status, while the latter are read as
a description of the social ordering and its degree of persistence. Distributive
features are then ltered into happiness on the basis of inclinations, beliefs
and values, dened respectively as innate character traits, priors about how
the world actually works, and preferences about how it should work [Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006]. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to
these three concepts with the sole term "values" in the following.
We want to see whether heterogeneity in personal values implies hetero-
geneity in the links between inequality and happiness. By focusing on the
importance of values, we take a leaf out of the book of a growing literature,
which shows how such factors aect economic outcomes through a variety
of channels: the attitude towards entrepreneurship [Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales, 2003], fertility choices [Fern andez and Fogli, 2006], organizational
behavior [Horii, Jin, and Levitt, 2005], and the quality of public governance
[Tabellini, 2006].
Besides the specic values held by an individual, we also take into ac-
count the prevailing ones in her reference community; here we follow the
7insight oered by psychologists Sagiv and Schwartz [2000], according to
whom
well-being [also] depends upon congruence between personal val-
ues and the prevailing value environment.
While this issue might be of secondary importance where perceived sta-
tus is concerned, it is prominent when we discuss the stance toward inequal-
ity as a representation of the social order. The distribution of income is
inuenced by the institutional and political features of a country, which can
be held to reect general preferences through the voting mechanism; this is a
standard result in public choice theory, from the Meltzer and Richard [1981]
model onwards. We bring it to the happiness eld by conjecturing that the
distance in terms of values between an individual and the representative
decider in her community might be a proxy of her degree of identication
with collective decisions concerning the distribution of income.
Formally, the model can be written as follows:
Hi = h(g(fi(x);jvi   vj);qi) (1)
where Hi is the happiness level for agent i, and h is the function describ-
ing the technology of happiness production. The function g describes how
the distance between vi, the vector of personal values for individual i, and
the average values in her community v interacts with the perceived density
function of income fi(x) in order to produce a judgement on distributive
matters. Finally, qi is a vector of controls, including known determinants of
happiness such as health and marital status.
4 The data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the second round of the Eu-
ropean Social Survey, carried out in 2004. The Survey, funded by the
European Commission, the European Science Foundation and several na-
tional partners, "has been mapping long-term attitudinal and behavioural
changes in Europe's social, political and moral climate" since 2001 [www.
europeansocialsurvey.org, 2007]. It is directed by an international Cen-
tral Co-ordinating Team based in London, and carried out every two years
8by independent national teams; a single questionnaire is created in English,
then translated into several languages. Contrary to other surveys of a simi-
lar nature, the sampling design is entirely probabilistic. In countries where
lists of households are available, the sampling unit is the household; other-
wise, the sampling unit is the street address, then a household living at that
address is chosen at random. In both cases, the nal respondent is an adult
chosen at random among the members of the household.
Each round has a core module which covers twelve broad topics, ranging
from demographics and nancial circumstances to political engagement and
subjective well-being. Several rotating modules, which vary from round to
round, complement the core module. We focus on the second round only,
disregarding the rst, not only because it covers a larger number of countries,
but also because it oers a rotating module on economic morality, which
helps to ascertain individual attitudes toward a wide range of economic
behavior. At the time of writing this paper, data for twenty-six countries
had been released to the public; we included twenty-three3. Most national
samples comprise between 1,500 and 2,500 observations, for a total of 43,650
and all come with design weights for national estimates. For Europe-wide
estimates, population weights are provided that correct for the imbalance in
sampling fractions.
Item non-response is a serious problem in the ESS; data on income and
data on personal values, both of which are essential to our model, are partic-
ularly aected. We tried to balance quality and quantity through a mixture
of model-based imputation, variable selection and data deletion, as discussed
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. The nal sample includes 35,335 observations, or
80.95 per cent of the original ESS sample (Table 1 and A.1), with national
samples ranging between 507 households for Iceland and 2,370 households
for Germany.
The ESS questionnaire can be found on the Web, along with method-
ological documentation. In the following, we skip a detailed discussion of
variables that were merely taken in their original state and inserted in our
estimates as controls; instead, we focus on the treatment of income variables,
and on the choice of indicators for beliefs and values.
3We excluded Italy, Turkey and Ukraine on account of heavy item non-response for
questions related to values and beliefs.









Austria 1,602 0.197 Luxembourg 1,295 2.868
Belgium 1,636 0.157 Netherlands 1,745 0.107
Czech Republic 1,781 0.174 Norway 1,710 0.374
Denmark 1,248 0.231 Poland 1,307 0.034
Estonia 1,289 0.954 Portugal 1,626 0.155
Finland 1,887 0.362 Slovakia 1,022 0.190
France 1,404 0.023 Slovenia 1,152 0.577
Germany 2,430 0.029 Spain 1,321 0.031
Greece 2,048 0.185 Sweden 1,754 0.195
Hungary 1,153 0.114 Switzerland 1,860 0.253
Iceland 507 1.745 United Kingdom 1,755 0.029
Ireland 1,803 0.448 Total 35,335 0.087
+Sampling fractions are computed based on population statistics for 1.1.2004, as provided
by Eurostat in Population and Social Conditions, 2005/15.
4.1 Income variables
The ESS questionnaire features the following item:
[I]f you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes
your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact
gure, please give an estimate.
Respondents are shown a card listing twelve brackets of weekly income,
each labeled with a dierent letter; the scale is also converted to monthly
and yearly equivalents for the sake of clarity. The brackets are of unequal
size, smaller at the bottom and larger at the top; the extreme ones are open-
ended, respectively including any income below 40 euro per week and any
income above 2,310 euro per week.
The item non-response rate for this question totals 19.61 per cent of the
nal sample, and is unevenly distributed across countries: in Norway and
Sweden it is below 3 per cent, while in Portugal and Greece it exceeds 30
per cent. Since the willingness to provide income information is very likely
to be correlated with culture and values, as suggested on an intuitive level
by the geographical distribution of response rates, the mere elimination of
observations with missing values would probably introduce selection bias
and distort the results of subsequent analyses.
10For each country, we estimate a simple logistic regression linking income
class with household size and with the answer to the following question:
Which of the[se] descriptions comes closest to how you feel about
your household's income nowadays: living comfortably on present
income, coping on present income, nding it dicult on present
income, or nding it very dicult on present income?
The model turns out to have good explanatory power for all countries,
with the share of concordant observation-prediction pairs ranging from 68.2
to 87.0 per cent depending on the country. We therefore employ it for
imputing missing values: the resulting distribution is close to the original
one (Table 2).
Table 2: Count and distribution of income classes
Class









1 96 409 505 1.39 1.44 1.43
2 331 1,394 1,725 4.78 4.91 4.88
3 608 2,176 2,784 8.77 7.66 7.88
4 1,185 4,068 5,253 17.10 14.32 14.87
5 919 4,033 4,952 13.26 14.20 14.01
6 804 3,255 4,059 11.60 11.46 11.49
7 645 2,772 3,417 9.31 9.76 9.67
8 678 2,799 3,477 9.78 9.85 9.84
9 980 4,540 5,520 14.14 15.98 15.62
10 406 1,941 2,347 5.86 6.83 6.64
11 147 605 752 2.12 2.13 2.13
12 132 412 544 1.90 1.45 1.54
Sample total 6,931 28,404 35,335 100.00 100.00 100.00
Row frequencies - - - 19.62 80.38 100.00
Even after taking care of missing data, we still are left with income
classes, not income levels: the only information available on those is limited
to the ve per cent of the original sample who answered a question on the
individual net pay of the respondent alone for his or her main occupation.
However, classes are not adequate to the estimation of position and dis-
persion measures, and neither are simple imputation procedures based on
random draws from uniform distributions within the classes. First, the dis-
tribution of income is generally log-normal, implying that the distribution
within classes is skewed to the left for low incomes and to the right for high
11incomes; the assumption of uniformity results in (probably asymmetrical)
overestimation of the weight on distribution tails, yielding in turn unpre-
dictable eects on inequality measures. Also, we need to take demographic
structure into account, especially because our sample includes both West-
ern and Eastern European countries; if, say, larger households are routinely
closer to the upper bound of their income class than smaller households,
neglecting household size and composition will lead to underestimation of
incomes in countries with higher fertility rates.
In order to take these important issues into account, we undertake a fur-
ther imputation step based on stratied density estimation. For each coun-
try and for each household size, a Gaussian kernel of the whole distribution
is estimated; the resulting density is then normalized within each class, so
that household incomes can be drawn at random. In order to perform this
operation in the extreme classes, we apply bottom-coding and top-coding:
the lowest bracket is closed at null income and the upper bracket is closed
at 150,000 euro.4Amounts thus obtained are equivalized with the modied
OECD equivalence scale. The weighted mean, median and standardized
interquartile range for the distribution of equivalent incomes are then com-
puted both at the national level and separately for each region, following the
EU-NUTS2 partition where the data allows, and the EU-NUTS1 partition
otherwise.
In our regressions, we use regional indicators of the distribution of income
rather than national ones. We follow an idea that is present throughout the
literature reviewed in Section 2: people are imperfectly informed about the
income of others, and in general the knowledge that person A has about the
standard of living of person B is inversely proportional to the geographical
distance between the two, both because of direct exposure and the impact of
local news media. This idea is incorporated in our model by assuming that
people derive their distributional facts from short-range information only.5
4Dierent choices, including the use of country-specic brackets, have been subjected
to testing and do not appear to exert any considerable inuence on the nal estimates.
5This strategy ignores the suggestion provided by public choice theory according to
which perceptions such as the one we are studying should be reconstructed based both on
where an agent lives and on his degree of interest in the phenomenon at hand: someone
who follows economic news closely might have a precise idea of the national and even
international distribution of income, while someone who is uninterested in the matter
might have a knowledge that is limited to her immediate neighborhood. The hypothesis
has been proven correct in several occasions, but we cannot employ it in our empirical work
for two reasons. Even if we were able to identify groups with dierent informational scopes,
124.2 Values
The ESS oers hundreds of value-related questions, but most of them are
only answered by a share of the sample. We need to select a subset of
variables that strike a reasonable balance between the richness of individual
information and the availability of valid observations. Once this goal is
attained, a small number of synthetic indicators must be produced so as to
provide convenient input for regression analysis.
We go about the rst task by classifying available information on beliefs
and values into six broad thematic categories: trust, solidarity, legality,
civic engagement, the family, and diversity. Within each domain, the three
variables with the lowest incidence of item non-response are chosen, for a
total of eighteen variables (Table A.2). Note that we do not focus exclusively
on concepts that immediately appear to have an intuitive connection with
the outlook on inequality: we want to eschew any self-fullling priors, such
as the idea that a favorable disposition to solidarity matters more than,
say, the level of trust toward others in determining what kind of income
distribution a person desires.
The eighteen items are then subjected to multiple correspondence anal-
ysis, a form of multivariate analysis suitable for qualitative data. This
technique is essentially a version of principal component analysis based on
the chi-square metric rather than on the euclidean metric; for details, see
Benz ecri [1973] and Lebart, Morineau and Warwick [1984]. In layman's
terms, we study how opinions expressed by individuals on a large set of top-
ics combine along a limited number of orthogonal dimensions called factors,
which are entirely endogenous to the data, and should serve as a way of
summarizing and interpreting it.6
which may be possible in the light of ESS items on newspaper-reading and TV-watching
habits, the sample size would not allow us to estimate inequality at the appropriate level
for the less informed, say town or district. Also, we would need assumptions concerning
not only the relationship between the self-reported degree of information and the scope
of knowledge about incomes, but also the distribution of the error term, which would
probably be both higher and more variable for the less informed. These two processes
appear to introduce a degree of arbitrariness that osets the gains.
6This micro-level perspective, while common in sociology [Inglehart and Baker, 2000],
so far has not been used frequently by economists, who prefer to dene types based on
exogenous partitions that function as proxies for inherited culture and customs: religious
denomination, nationality, ethnicity. There are valid reasons for this choice: most impor-
tantly, the set of priors and preferences accruing to a certain type of religious doctrine
or to a certain national community has been shown to be so slow-moving that reverse
causation from almost any dependent variable to those features can be ruled out, at least
13The estimation of multiple correspondences yields a reasonably good
t, with the rst two factors explaining 79.4 per cent of the total variance
generated by the eighteen individual variables (Table 3). Factor loadings
are reported in Table A.3, complete with relevant t statistics.













1 0.16374 0.01312 48.88 48.88 ************************
2 0.14101 0.00819 30.5 79.38 ***************
3 0.09443 0.00169 6.31 85.69 ***
4 0.08447 0.00094 3.49 89.18 **
5 0.08029 0.00069 2.56 91.74 *
6 0.07641 0.00049 1.82 93.55 *
7 0.07391 0.00038 1.41 94.96 *
8 0.07245 0.00032 1.19 96.15 *
9 0.07198 0.00030 1.13 97.28 *
+Only factors that explain one per cent or more of global variance are included in the table.
Factor 1 explains 48.9 per cent of total variance. With reference to
the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you can't be too careful?", for which an 11-point response
scale is oered where 0 means "You can't be too careful" and 10 means "Most
people can be trusted", positive factor loadings are estimated on scores 4 to
9; they are highest for scores 6 and 7. Negative loadings appear for very low
scores and for the top score (Figure 1). For the question "When jobs are
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women", positive loadings
are observed for "Agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", and "Disagree",
with the latter option being also the one with the highest estimate; negative
loadings are found for "Strongly agree" and "Strongly disagree". In the
case of "How wrong is it for someone to sell something second-hand and
conceal some or all of its faults?", positive loadings again apply for the
intermediate response options, "A bit wrong" and "Wrong", while "Not
wrong at all" and "Seriously wrong" are associated with negative estimates.
A similar U-shaped prole for loadings emerges for the ve-point agreement
in the short run. We try to simultaneously preserve the high degree of freedom and detail
allowed by the latent variable approach and avoid the problems of causality by limiting
the analysis to beliefs and preferences that appear to be set deep in the psychological
makeup of individuals or in their upbringing, and should therefore not be inuenced by
the level of happiness experienced in a given period
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scale proposed for "Society would be better o if everyone just looked after
themselves", for the four possible answers to "To what extent do you think
your country should allow people of a dierent race to come and live here?",
and for nearly all other questions.
The picture painted by the analysis of loadings seems to suggest that
Factor 1 can be tentatively interpreted as an indicator of moderation, de-
ned as the tendency to express mild opinions rather than extreme ones:
individuals who score high on this factor are more likely to report agree-
ment, disagreement or (less frequently) lack of opinion with respect to any
given statement than to express strong agreement or strong disagreement.
The inclination towards moderation measured by the factor turns out to be
independent of the specic beliefs held: negative loadings are consistently
estimated for extreme values of the agreement scale on items as dierent as
"A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of
her family" and "Gay men and lesbians should be free to live as they wish".
Factor 2 explains 30.5 per cent of total variance. Positive factor loadings
are associated with high levels of trust (score 6 or above), disagreement or
strong disagreement with a men-rst policy in the job market, thorough con-
demnation of fraud, disagreement or strong disagreement with the idea that
society would be better if everyone looked after themselves, and openness
towards immigrants of dierent races. Individuals who score high on this











































axis also believe that citizens should spend some of their free time helping
others, state that they are not afraid of being treated dishonestly, appear
supportive of gender equality under a number of perspectives, and actively
participate in politics.
The joint consideration of these elements hints as a possible interpre-
tation of Factor 2 in terms of inclusiveness, dened as support for the ex-
tension of rights and opportunities to everyone, regardless of background
and circumstances. There is also an element of social cohesion based on the
consistent subscription to a shared set of rules.
Figure 2 represents country means on the two factor axes. Scandinavia
scores high on both moderation and inclusiveness, while Mediterranean
countries and Eastern European ones are located in the opposite quadrant.
Central European and Anglophone countries display positive scores for mod-
eration, and hover around the mean with respect to inclusiveness.
The analysis of the correlation matrix between factor scores and other
individual traits reveals that associations between values, demographics and
social class are weak, with the Pearson correlation coecient reaching a
maximum of 0.39 in the case of inclusiveness and the number of years spent
in formal education. Income also feebly correlates with both moderation
(0.12) and inclusiveness (0.23), while age seems to have no correlation with
16the former (-0.07) and a slightly negative correlation (-0.14) with the latter.
5 Results
We want to test whether heterogeneity in values, as summarized in our
two-factor representation, also implies heterogeneity in the links between
inequality and happiness. To this end, we run a set of ordered logits where
the degree of happiness in a scale ranging from 0 to 10 appears on the
left-hand side, while a number of variables related to the distribution of
income at the regional level appear on the right-hand side both in raw form
and interacted with measures of distance from national means in terms of
moderation and inclusiveness. These core variables are supplemented by a
large number of controls that are routinely used in happiness regressions.
Table 4 presents our results. Values seem indeed to have a role in the
way the distribution of income aects subjective well-being. The regres-
sion coecient for our indicator of inequality, the standardized interquartile
range of equivalent incomes at the regional level, amounts to 0.24, and after
correction of standard errors for clustering it is barely signicant. However,
the interaction between the same indicator and individual distance in mod-
eration from the national mean has a coecient of -1.27, signicant at the
1 per cent level; the interaction between inequality and individual distance
in inclusiveness from the national mean reports a coecient of -0.63 and it
is signicant at the 5 per cent level.
Table 4: Ordered logit estimates for happiness
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Equivalent income
Log own 0.144 0.024 0.000
*Moderation (distance from mean) -0.081 0.070 0.248
*Inclusiveness (distance from mean) -0.160 0.073 0.028
Std interquartile range, regional 0.248 0.150 0.098
*Moderation -1.272 0.282 0.000
*Inclusiveness -0.627 0.307 0.041
Log median, national 0.466 0.171 0.006
*Moderation -0.026 0.252 0.917
*Inclusiveness -0.469 0.330 0.156
Log median, regional -0.105 0.165 0.525
*Moderation -0.201 0.253 0.426
*Inclusiveness 0.225 0.349 0.520
Demographics
Gender: female 0.115 0.038 0.002
Age -0.066 0.009 0.000
17Table 4: Ordered logit estimates for happiness (continued)
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000
Self-reported health (baseline=very good)
Good -0.578 0.053 0.000
Fair -1.062 0.075 0.000
Bad -1.756 0.114 0.000
Very bad -2.447 0.334 0.000
Marital status (baseline=married or in registered cohabitation)
Separated -0.964 0.148 0.000
Divorced -0.635 0.073 0.000
Widowed -0.927 0.076 0.000
Never married -0.647 0.049 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.058 0.049 0.233
Children living outside the home 0.146 0.051 0.004
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.588 0.080 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.157 0.017 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.004 0.072 0.957
Town or small city 0.065 0.062 0.291
Country village 0.125 0.063 0.047
Farm or home in countryside 0.288 0.108 0.008
Feeling of safety in own neighborhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.084 0.043 0.053
Unsafe -0.180 0.061 0.003
Very unsafe -0.332 0.115 0.004
Job status (baseline = employee)
Student 0.060 0.080 0.453
Unemployed, looking for job -0.558 0.116 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.374 0.148 0.011
Permanently sick or disabled 0.085 0.139 0.540
Retired 0.168 0.067 0.012
Community or military service 0.258 0.279 0.355
Housework 0.051 0.066 0.439
Other -0.206 0.183 0.259
Other factors
Years in formal education -0.002 0.006 0.775
Intensity of religious belief 0.054 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.538 0.091 0.000
Homeowner 0.102 0.044 0.021
Marginal eect of distance from the mean in values
Moderation 3.922 0.715 0.000
Inclusiveness 5.062 1.065 0.000
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.061
+Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level (inclusion of national median
of equivalent income in the regression)
In other words, people who are more moderate or more inclusive than
18their fellow citizens tend to dislike inequality more. Since we are discussing
moral traits, it is quite hard to give a strict quantitative interpretation to
the absolute values of regression coecients; but the distances from national
means in terms of moderation and inclusiveness have similar standard devi-
ations, respectively estimated at 0.38 and 0.35, and it is therefore reasonable
to say that, for a given relative distance from the mainstream, increases of
inequality aect more or less twice as badly those who are distant because
of moderation than those who are distant because of inclusiveness.
The result can be interpreted as follows: those who are more moderate
than their compatriots might dislike inequality because it acts as a trigger for
social tension, conict and unrest, as described by the literature referenced
in Section 1; those who are particularly inclusive might dislike inequality
because they perceive it as morally unfair. The former motive, known in
the literature as instrumental inequality aversion, appears to be stronger
than the latter, substantive inequality aversion.
Values appear to be signicant also when it comes to deriving happiness
from one's own income. The net eect of the logarithm of equivalent income
is positive, but turns negative when interacted with inclusiveness: this may
be an example of the guilt eect outlined in Section 2. The interaction ele-
ments are not signicant when it comes to the impact exerted on happiness
by the general standard of living, as expressed by the national median of
equivalent incomes: the marginal eect is positive and signicant, the inter-
action terms are not signicant. Finally, no comparative eects as measured
by the eect of the regional median of equivalent income emerge from our
model.
Moderation and inclusiveness in excess of the general reference level also
have a positive marginal impact on happiness, with coecients of 3.92 and
5.06 respectively. Where inclusiveness is concerned, this is consistent with
studies that show how higher levels of trust and of general openness toward
other people are associated with higher happiness. In the case of moderation,
the result might reect a comfortable distance from events, inducing an abil-
ity to lter them into feelings in a more level-headed manner. The intuition
is particularly suitable to our sample, entirely composed of European coun-
tries where disastrous phenomena such as famine, disease epidemics, war
on domestic territory and destruction wrought by extreme weather condi-
tions are virtually unknown. While a strong disposition toward moderation
19might not be able to curb unhappiness from such occurrences, it can reduce
the impact of run-of-the-mill unpleasant happenings. This explanation is,
however, entirely speculative.
Finally, results on the set of controls are entirely aligned with previous
literature. Among the circumstances positively associated with happiness we
nd good health, marriage or cohabitation, residence in a safe neighborhood,
intense religious belief, and the enjoyment of close friendships. On the other
hand, belonging to a discriminated group, having limited social interaction,
and living in a large city exert a negative impact.
We have so far looked at moderation and inclusiveness as separate di-
mensions. In the spirit of understanding whether the interaction of the two
might impact happiness directly, and also as a manner of carrying out sensi-
tivity analysis, we estimated two further specications of our regression: the
rst is based on the simple consideration of the Cartesian quadrants dened
by the two orthogonal factors, the second is founded on non-hierarchical
k-means cluster analysis [Anderberg, 1973; Everitt, 1980].
Table A.4 shows that signicant inequality aversion is found in the two
high-moderation quadrants; high inclusiveness intensies the phenomenon
slightly, but it is not a requisite for its existence. The coecient for inter-
action between inequality and the high-inclusiveness, low-moderation quad-
rant dummy is not signicant, although it has the expected negative sign.
Cluster analysis reveals the presence of four clusters, described in Table
A.5. Regressions that include cluster dummies (Table A.6) give insights
similar to those presented above: signicant inequality aversion is found for
Cluster 2, which comprises people with high moderation scores, while a non-
signicant negative coecient is found for the highly inclusive individuals
in Cluster 4.
In general, when below-average moderation is accompanied by above-
average inclusiveness, the impact of the former appears to outweigh the
impact of the latter, consistently with the results presented above. It is also
possible that intra-class variability aects the estimates more when it comes
to inclusiveness than when it comes to moderation, notwithstanding simi-
lar distributions and independent of whether standardization procedures are
employed to neutralize outliers, suggesting that the eect of relative inclu-
siveness goes in the same direction but is both weaker and more markedly
non-linear than the eect of relative moderation.
206 Conclusions
This paper set out with the goal of understanding whether it is possible to
model the relationship between inequality and happiness in a way that is
consistently appropriate across domains and takes into account both posi-
tional and interpretational eects. We looked at the heterogeneity of values,
inclinations and beliefs as a possible unifying explanation for the existence
of dierent reactions to inequality.
Drawing on data for twenty-three countries from the second round of
the European Social Survey, carried out in 2004, we found that individual
views on a wide range of themes can be eectively summarized by two
orthogonal dimensions: moderation and inclusiveness. The former is dened
as a tendency to take mild stands on issues rather than extreme ones; the
latter is dened as the degree of support for a social model that grants equal
rights to everyone who willingly subscribes to a shared set of rules, regardless
of background and circumstances.
We ran a set of ordered logits where the degree of happiness on a 0-10
scale appears on the left-hand side, while distributional indicators interacted
with individual distances from country means in terms of moderation and
inclusiveness appear on the right-hand side, supplemented by a set of stan-
dard controls. We chose to look at distances from country means rather than
raw levels in order to account for the fact that all the countries in the sample
are democracies, where redistributive policies are endogenous with respect
to values insofar as they capture, at least to some extent, the opinions and
desires of the representative voter.
Values turn out to matter when it comes to determining the sign and the
intensity of the relationship between inequality and happiness. In particu-
lar, individuals who are either more moderate or more inclusive than their
average compatriot tend to dislike inequality. With reference to moderation,
inequality aversion can be read in terms of a desire for stability: people who
are reluctant to take strong stands probably also resent social tension and
unrest, which often accompany inequality. With reference to inclusiveness,
the main element at play is likely to be a negative reaction to perceived
unfairness. The eect of moderation appears to be stronger than the eect
of inclusiveness: instrumental inequality aversion is probably more frequent
and more intense than substantive inequality aversion.
21Worldview eects appeared to be signicant also with reference to the
impact of personal income on happiness. The net eect of the logarithm of
own equivalent income is positive for all clusters, but it is remarkably less
intense, approximating zero, for people with a strong drive toward inclusion.
The marginal eect of values was found to be positive and signicant
with reference to those who exceed either average moderation or average
inclusiveness. While the result on inclusiveness is expected, on account of
a well-known relationship between openness toward others, trust and hap-
piness, the positive sign on moderation was somewhat unanticipated. One
possible explanation may start from the observation that the sample only
includes developed countries, largely immune from disastrous phenomena
such as widespread extreme poverty or war on domestic territory. Most
events that can be perceived as unpleasant, barring health conditions that
are controlled for in our regressions, are probably minor; if moderation is as-
sociated with a comfortable emotional distance from mundane disruptions,
then it is bound to have a positive impact on happiness.
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27A Appendix
Table A.1: Deleted observations and imputed incomes, by country
Country Starting
size
Deleted observations Imputed incomes
N Fraction N Fraction
Austria 2,256 654 0.29 627 0.28
Belgium 1,778 142 0.08 343 0.19
Czech Republic 3,026 1245 0.41 473 0.16
Denmark 1,487 239 0.16 127 0.09
Estonia 1,989 700 0.35 232 0.12
Finland 2,022 135 0.07 121 0.06
France+ 1,806 402 0.22 0 0.00
Germany 2,870 440 0.15 480 0.17
Greece 2,406 358 0.15 630 0.26
Hungary 1,498 345 0.23 131 0.09
Iceland 579 72 0.12 57 0.10
Ireland 2,286 483 0.21 379 0.17
Luxembourg 1,635 340 0.21 457 0.28
Netherlands 1,881 136 0.07 197 0.10
Norway 1,760 50 0.03 39 0.02
Poland 1,716 409 0.24 198 0.12
Portugal 2,052 426 0.21 678 0.33
Slovakia 1,512 490 0.32 325 0.21
Slovenia 1,442 290 0.20 208 0.14
Spain 1,663 342 0.21 446 0.27
Sweden 1,948 194 0.10 98 0.05
Switzerland 2,141 281 0.13 348 0.16
United Kingdom 1,897 142 0.07 337 0.18
Total 43,650 8,315 0.19 6,931 0.16
+ No imputed incomes for France on account of unavailability of subjective quality-of-life

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table A.3: Item factor loadings and goodness-of-t statistics
Var Response Dim1 Dim2 Contr1 Contr2 Quality Mass Inertia
You can't be too careful -1.0472 -0.6244 0.0200 0.0082 0.0889 0.0030 0.0118
1 -0.7413 -0.6472 0.0069 0.0061 0.0371 0.0020 0.0120
2 -0.3746 -0.5753 0.0034 0.0093 0.0363 0.0040 0.0116
3 -0.0504 -0.4469 0.0001 0.0088 0.0258 0.0062 0.0111








5 0.0649 -0.0901 0.0003 0.0007 0.0118 0.0125 0.0097
6 0.3329 0.2008 0.0042 0.0018 0.0191 0.0062 0.0111
7 0.3465 0.4755 0.0059 0.0129 0.0585 0.0080 0.0107
8 0.1474 0.7028 0.0007 0.0187 0.0618 0.0053 0.0113
9 -0.0292 0.8783 0.0000 0.0063 0.0227 0.0012 0.0122
Most people can be trusted -0.5470 0.5488 0.0014 0.0016 0.0103 0.0007 0.0123
Not at all worried -0.0698 0.1976 0.0004 0.0041 0.0175 0.0148 0.0092








Fairly worried -0.1263 -0.2282 0.0011 0.0040 0.0179 0.0108 0.0101
Very worried -0.9168 -0.2029 0.0145 0.0008 0.0571 0.0028 0.0119
Disagree strongly -0.8050 0.5514 0.0035 0.0019 0.0159 0.0009 0.0123








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3516 0.1400 0.0077 0.0014 0.0692 0.0102 0.0102
Agree 0.2379 -0.1426 0.0084 0.0035 0.0668 0.0243 0.0070
Agree strongly -0.8574 -0.1037 0.0554 0.0009 0.2129 0.0123 0.0097
Disagree strongly -1.8246 -0.5613 0.0075 0.0008 0.0253 0.0004 0.0124








Neither agree nor disagree 0.2652 -0.0840 0.0046 0.0005 0.1277 0.0106 0.0101
Agree 0.2099 -0.0637 0.0089 0.0010 0.1152 0.0330 0.0051
Agree strongly -0.9893 0.4282 0.0525 0.0114 0.2289 0.0088 0.0105
Disagree strongly -0.4747 0.7168 0.0158 0.0418 0.2050 0.0115 0.0099








Neither agree nor disagree 0.1633 -0.3549 0.0013 0.0069 0.1202 0.0077 0.0108
Agree -0.1897 -0.6238 0.0017 0.0207 0.0690 0.0075 0.0108
Agree strongly -1.5097 -0.4811 0.0384 0.0045 0.1354 0.0028 0.0119
Disagree strongly -0.4795 0.4171 0.0022 0.0019 0.0143 0.0016 0.0122








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3859 0.0336 0.0078 0.0001 0.0657 0.0086 0.0106
Agree 0.2717 -0.1119 0.0106 0.0021 0.0670 0.0235 0.0072
Agree strongly -0.8008 0.0132 0.0575 0.0000 0.2306 0.0147 0.0092
Not wrong at all -1.2506 -0.7478 0.0056 0.0023 0.0694 0.0006 0.0124








Wrong 0.2431 -0.1340 0.0094 0.0033 0.0841 0.0260 0.0067
Seriously wrong -0.2266 0.2063 0.0079 0.0076 0.1817 0.0252 0.0068
Not wrong at all -0.9787 -0.6764 0.0032 0.0018 0.0791 0.0005 0.0124








Wrong 0.1646 -0.3626 0.0025 0.0139 0.0935 0.0149 0.0092
Seriously wrong -0.0536 0.1725 0.0007 0.0081 0.1818 0.0385 0.0038
Disagree strongly -1.0103 0.1576 0.0073 0.0002 0.0227 0.0012 0.0122








Neither agree nor disagree 0.1516 -0.0422 0.0010 0.0001 0.1012 0.0073 0.0108
Agree 0.3489 -0.1135 0.0220 0.0027 0.1696 0.0295 0.0059
Agree strongly -0.6997 0.2880 0.0420 0.0083 0.2119 0.0141 0.0093
Not at all interested -0.5556 -0.0617 0.0176 0.0240 0.1637 0.0093 0.0104








Quite interested 0.2306 0.2756 0.0065 0.0108 0.1059 0.0201 0.0080
Very interested -0.1455 0.7950 0.0008 0.0260 0.1193 0.0058 0.0112
No -0.2534 -0.4323 0.0044 0.0149 0.1104 0.0112 0.0100





Not eligible to vote 0.1353 0.1165 0.0005 0.0004 0.1148 0.0044 0.0115
30Table A.3: Item factor loadings and goodness-of-t statistics (cont.)
Var Response Dim1 Dim2 Contr1 Contr2 Quality Mass Inertia
No time at all -0.3160 -0.2320 0.0093 0.0058 0.0812 0.0152 0.0091
Less than 0.5 hour 0.0942 0.0590 0.0009 0.0004 0.0370 0.0174 0.0086
0.5 to 1 hr 0.1648 0.1330 0.0026 0.0020 0.0663 0.0158 0.0090








1.5 to 2 hr 0.0398 -0.0503 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0016 0.0121
2 to 2.5 hr 0.1277 0.0559 0.0001 0.0000 0.0046 0.0006 0.0124
2.5 to 3 hr -0.1789 0.1822 0.0001 0.0001 0.0052 0.0003 0.0124
More than 3 hr -0.1673 0.0554 0.0001 0.0000 0.0047 0.0005 0.0124
Disagree strongly -0.8380 1.2236 0.0180 0.0445 0.2253 0.0042 0.0116








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3271 0.0005 0.0082 0.0000 0.0991 0.0125 0.0097
Agree 0.1859 -0.3655 0.0044 0.0196 0.1814 0.0207 0.0078
Agree strongly -1.2744 -0.3475 0.0615 0.0053 0.2263 0.0062 0.0111
Disagree strongly -1.6401 -0.6477 0.0070 0.0013 0.0242 0.0004 0.0124








Neither agree nor disagree 0.1796 -0.4752 0.0009 0.0071 0.0427 0.0044 0.0115
Agree 0.4558 -0.1885 0.0368 0.0073 0.2974 0.0290 0.0060
Agree strongly -0.6524 0.4855 0.0506 0.0326 0.3767 0.0195 0.0081
Disagree strongly -0.5052 1.0501 0.0179 0.0900 0.4080 0.0115 0.0099








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3018 -0.3207 0.0059 0.0077 0.0772 0.0106 0.0101
Agree 0.0171 -0.7548 0.0000 0.0426 0.1760 0.0106 0.0101
Agree strongly -1.5151 -0.7071 0.0614 0.0155 0.2503 0.0044 0.0115
Disagree strongly -1.2129 -0.7597 0.0284 0.0129 0.1406 0.0032 0.0118








Neither agree nor disagree 0.0906 -0.5395 0.0004 0.0153 0.0571 0.0074 0.0108
Agree 0.4130 -0.0809 0.0241 0.0011 0.1559 0.0231 0.0073
Agree strongly -0.3482 0.7124 0.0126 0.0613 0.3391 0.0170 0.0087
Country made worse -1.3786 -0.9029 0.0066 0.0134 0.0566 0.0023 0.0120
1 -0.6843 -0.9044 0.0304 0.0151 0.1353 0.0026 0.0119
2 -0.3571 -0.7839 0.0031 0.0175 0.0607 0.0040 0.0116
3 -0.0137 -0.5541 0.0000 0.0126 0.0401 0.0058 0.0112








5 0.1702 0.0958 0.0031 0.0011 0.0406 0.0173 0.0086
6 0.3740 0.2714 0.0049 0.0030 0.0247 0.0058 0.0112
7 0.2782 0.5574 0.0026 0.0119 0.0423 0.0054 0.0113
8 -0.0119 0.8448 0.0000 0.0204 0.0576 0.0040 0.0116
9 -0.2717 1.1180 0.0005 0.0101 0.0285 0.0011 0.0122
Country made better -0.8320 1.2718 0.0052 0.0141 0.0522 0.0012 0.0122
Allow none -0.8013 -0.9506 0.0284 0.0464 0.2337 0.0072 0.0109








Allow some 0.2946 0.2731 0.0120 0.0120 0.1135 0.0226 0.0074
Allow many -0.1737 1.0522 0.0012 0.0516 0.1540 0.0066 0.0110
31Table A.4: Ordered logit estimates for happiness: quadrants
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Equivalent income
(baseline for interaction terms: SW Quadrant, Mod < mean; Incl < mean)
Log own 0.283 0.064 0.000
*NW Quadrant Mod < mean; Incl > mean -0.163 0.086 0.057
*NE Quadrant Mod > mean; Incl > mean -0.227 0.079 0.004
*SE Quadrant Mod > mean; Incl < mean -0.117 0.062 0.057
Std interquartile range, regional 0.740 0.279 0.008
*NW Quadrant -0.293 0.298 0.325
*NE Quadrant -0.883 0.307 0.004
*SE Quadrant -0.640 0.265 0.016
Log median, national 0.732 0.306 0.017
*NW Quadrant -0.417 0.348 0.230
*NE Quadrant -0.302 0.282 0.284
*SE Quadrant -0.310 0.277 0.264
Log median, regional -0.278 0.324 0.391
*NW Quadrant 0.300 0.394 0.446
*NE Quadrant 0.097 0.295 0.742
*SE Quadrant -0.160 0.278 0.566
Demographics
Gender: female 0.134 0.037 0.000
Age -0.062 0.009 0.000
Age squared 0.006 0.000 0.000
Self-reported health (baseline=very good)
Good -0.583 0.052 0.000
Fair -1.077 0.075 0.000
Bad -1.784 0.115 0.000
Very bad -2.420 0.336 0.000
Marital status (baseline=married or in registered cohabitation)
Separated -0.932 0.146 0.000
Divorced -0.624 0.072 0.000
Widowed -0.924 0.077 0.000
Never married -0.631 0.049 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.067 0.048 0.169
Children living outside the home 0.144 0.051 0.004
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.606 0.080 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.162 0.017 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.008 0.075 0.912
Town or small city 0.051 0.061 0.408
Country village 0.103 0.062 0.096
Farm or home in countryside 0.249 0.107 0.020
Feeling of safety in own neighborhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.107 0.045 0.016
Unsafe -0.217 0.062 0.001
Very unsafe -0.364 0.113 0.001
Job status
Student 0.099 0.078 0.204
Unemployed, looking for job -0.561 0.114 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.380 0.148 0.010
32Table A.4: Ordered logit estimates for happiness: quadrants (cont.)
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Permanently sick or disabled 0.085 0.140 0.610
Retired 0.159 0.066 0.015
Community or military service 0.295 0.266 0.268
Housework 0.042 0.064 0.512
Other -0.193 0.179 0.279
Other factors
Years in formal education 0.004 0.006 0.424
Intensity of religious belief 0.054 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.516 0.090 0.000
Homeowner 0.094 0.044 0.034
Marginal eect of distance from the mean in values
(baseline = SW Quadrant)
NW Quadrant 3.349 0.849 0.000
NE Quadrant 5.200 0.701 0.000
SE Quadrant 3.116 0.849 0.000
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.059
+ Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level (inclusion of national
median of equivalent income in the regression)
Table A.5: Cluster means, standard deviations, and descriptions
Cluster N
Distance from country mean:
Description Moderation Inclusiveness
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
1 12,500 -0.268 0.335 -0.032 0.205 - Mod (weak)
2 11,484 0.360 0.137 -0.076 0.191 ++ Mod
3 4,332 -0.110 0.342 -0.540 0.144 - Mod (weak), { Incl
4 7,019 -0.062 0.296 0.511 0.209 ++ Incl
33Table A.6: Ordered logit estimates for happiness: clusters
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Equivalent income (baseline for interaction terms = Cluster 1 Mod < mean)
Log own 0.219 0.049 0.000
*Cluster 2 Mod > mean -0.068 0.057 0.238
*Cluster 3 Mod < mean (weak); Incl < mean -0.058 0.075 0.436
*Cluster 4 Incl > mean -0.156 0.075 0.039
Std interquartile range, regional 0.584 0.201 0.004
*Cluster 2 -0.734 0.197 0.000
*Cluster 3 0.261 0.336 0.439
*Cluster 4 -0.652 0.289 0.024
Log median, national 0.504 0.221 0.023
*Cluster 2 -0.017 0.213 0.935
*Cluster 3 0.213 0.447 0.633
*Cluster 4 -0.344 0.296 0.246
Log median, regional -0.140 0.214 0.512
*Cluster 2 -0.063 0.210 0.763
*Cluster 3 -0.078 0.465 0.866
*Cluster 4 0.195 0.281 0.487
Demographics
Gender: female 0.132 0.037 0.000
Age -0.063 0.009 0.000
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000
Self-reported health (baseline=very good)
Good -0.579 0.052 0.000
Fair -1.070 0.074 0.000
Bad -1.755 0.114 0.000
Very bad -2.447 0.339 0.000
Marital status (baseline=married or in registered cohabitation)
Separated -0.936 0.151 0.000
Divorced -0.617 0.071 0.000
Widowed -0.923 0.075 0.000
Never married -0.634 0.048 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.061 0.048 0.196
Children living outside the home 0.143 0.051 0.005
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.615 0.080 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.162 0.017 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.018 0.074 0.806
*no a qui Town or small city 0.045 0.062 0.463
Country village 0.093 0.063 0.143
Farm or home in countryside 0.244 0.109 0.025
Feeling of safety in own neighborhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.114 0.043 0.008
Unsafe -0.224 0.061 0.000
Very unsafe -0.375 0.112 0.001
Job status
Student 0.096 0.080 0.228
Unemployed, looking for job -0.555 0.114 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.407 0.146 0.005
Permanently sick or disabled 0.086 0.143 0.548
34Table A.6: Ordered logit estimates for happiness: clusters (cont.)
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Retired 0.154 0.066 0.020
Community or military service 0.259 0.284 0.361
Housework 0.033 0.066 0.610
Other -0.194 0.182 0.287
Other factors
Years in formal education 0.006 0.006 0.298
Intensity of religious belief 0.053 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.514 0.093 0.000
Homeowner 0.097 0.045 0.030
Marginal eect of distance from the mean in values (baseline = Cluster 1)
Cluster 2 1.934 0.542 0.000
Cluster 3 -1.393 1.068 0.192
Cluster 4 3.662 0.823 0.000
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.059
+ Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level (inclusion of national
median of equivalent income in the regression)
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